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Abstract
The 2021 Daraa al-Balad crisis and its outcomes have opened a new 
chapter in the history of southern Syria. The trajectory of the conflict,
the terms of the final agreement and the ensuing proliferation of new 
‘reconciliation’ processes reveal a clear shift in Moscow’s approach 
in southern Syria. The recent agreements reconfigure local orders 
and allow the Syrian regime to deconstruct networks of resistance 
and expand its security control in parts of the south.
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Introduction
In many respects, the trajectory of the Daraa 
al-Balad crisis and the way the conflict wound 
down reveal a clear shift in Russia’s approach in 
southern Syria. While regional politics led Russia 
to grant former rebels some room for manoeuvre 
and allowed a restricted return of the regime 
to southern Syria in 2018,1 recent changes in 
regional politics – namely the outcome of the 
most recent Israeli parliamentary election and 
the rapprochement between Jordan and Syria – 
have seemingly prompted Russia to rethink the 
order that had prevailed in Daraa in the previous 
three years.2 In the 2021 Daraa al-Balad 
conflict Moscow gradually hardened its position 
regarding local opposition representatives and 
with an outright threat to back the Syrian military 
forces enforced a new deal that favoured the 
regime and rescinded core terms in the 2018 
agreement. Far from being a resolution of a 
local conflict, it soon turned out that Daraa al-
Balad was the first domino to be toppled and the 
terms of the new agreement were reproduced 
across many localities in Daraa. Based on semi-
structured interviews conducted between June 
and October 2021 with civilian, military and (un)
reconciled rebel actors, this policy brief provides 
an analysis of the ways in which the 2021 
Russian-brokered agreement impact existing 
networks of resistance and redefine local orders 
in southern Syria.
1. The Domino Effect: The Daraa 
al-Balad Conflict and a Proliferation 
of ‘Reconciliation’ Processes 
On 24 June 2021, the Syrian regime sieged the 
Daraa al-Balad area, the old part of Daraa city 
that had been under rebel control until the 2018 
1 Aron Lund, “Assad Shores Up Control in Syria’s Symbolically Important South,” World Politics Review, 16 September 2021, https://bit.
ly/2XY1ra8; Armenak Tokmajyan, “How Southern Syria Has Been Transformed into a Regional Powder Keg,” Carnegie Middle East 
Center, 14 July 2020, https://bit.ly/2SbfyCK
2 Abdullah Al-Jabassini, “Russia Rethinks the Status Quo in Southern Syria,” Middle East Institute, 13 August 2021, https://bit.ly/3AAx-
6MZ
3 An aggregation of civilian opposition figures, former rebel leaders and local notables who acted as interlocutors with Russia and re-
gime officials since the conclusion of the 2018 agreement. Two main committees have operated in Daraa governorate – one in Daraa 
al-Balad and one in Tafas – which also intervened to represent the city’s surrounding localities. Abdullah Al-Jabassini, “Governance 
in Daraa, Southern Syria: The Roles of Military and Civilian Intermediaries,” Research Project Report (Florence: European University 
Institute, Middle East Directions, Wartime and Post-Conflict in Syria, November 2019), http://bit.ly/38eCzKA 
4 The MSCSS is led by the head of the General Intelligence Directorate, Major-General Hussam Luqa, and includes the General Com-
mander of the First Corps of the Syrian army, Major-General Mufeed Younis Hasan, and the head of the Military Security Branch, 
Brigadier Louay al-Ali. 
Russian-brokered ‘reconciliation’ agreement. 
The siege resulted from a flat rejection by the 
Central Negotiations Committee (CNC)3 of a list 
of demands delivered by Asad Allah, a newly 
appointed Russian officer at the time, to (1) 
surrender light and medium-sized weapons and 
(2) allow the Syrian military and security forces 
to search the area and nearby farms. During the 
tight several-month-long siege, intense clashes 
between groups of unreconciled rebels and the 
Syrian military and security forces frequently 
occurred, representing the deadliest and fiercest
armed confrontations southern Syria had 
witnessed since 2018. 
During the offensive there were several truces 
and negotiations, which quickly became locked in 
stalemate as the Military and Security Committee 
of Southern Syria (MSCSS) – a group of high-
ranking military and security official 4 – and the 
Daraa al-Balad CNC failed to reach a consensus. 
Two main points of contention remained: first,
the MSCSS’s demand to establish increasing 
numbers of security and military outposts in 
Daraa al-Balad; and second, the displacement 
of ‘reconciliation’ rejectionists, including two 
main unreconciled rebels accused of having 
ties with Islamic State, Mouayad al-Harfoush 
and Mohammed al-Masalmeh. The CNC was 
blamed for facilitating the displacements and 
therefore lost a great deal of its leverage over the 
behaviour of unreconciled rebels, who operated 
as spoilers of potential agreements that involved 
population relocations.
Russia made a last-minute intervention to end 
the conflict. On 5 September 2021, it increased 
its pressure on the CNC and revealed an 
outright willingness to back the Syrian military 
offensive if the conflict did not end in a peaceful 
settlement. Under increasing pressure and a 
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balance of power that continued to favour the 
regime, the CNC was obliged to accept the deal. 
The new agreement stipulated (1) a ceasefire,
(2) a handover of light and medium-sized 
arms, (3) ‘reconciliation’ of the status of wanted 
individuals, (4) acceptance of the establishment 
of nine lightly equipped security checkpoints and 
(5) the CNC allowing regime forces to search the 
area and check the identity cards of the residents 
to ensure no strangers are present in Daraa al-
Balad. The CNC has reportedly requested the 
MSCSS to work on the release of detainees and 
to provide information on missing individuals. 
Noteworthily, the deal excluded al-Harfoush 
and al-Masalmeh, who have absconded to an 
unknown place. 
On the next day, the regime opened ‘reconciliation’ 
centres in Daraa al-Balad, where hundreds of light 
and medium-sized weapons were surrendered. 
In addition, wanted people, including civilians, 
former rebels, military defectors, evaders and 
deserters, approached ‘reconciliation’ centres 
to embark on a ‘reconciliation’ process. On 8 
September, officers from the Russian Military 
Police accompanied by members of the Syrian 
military and security forces wandered into the 
area and checked the residents’ identity cards. 
The regime ordered the removal of barriers and 
the re-opening of roads that connect Daraa al-
Balad to other parts of the city. On 9 September, 
the regime lifted the siege, re-opened the police 
station and established nine lightly armed 
checkpoints staffed by 20-25 members. Under 
the supervision of the Russian-backed Eighth 
Brigade, nearly 38,000 internally displaced 
people (IDPs), mostly women and children who 
during the siege had fled the area to other parts 
of the city and its surrounding farms, began to 
return to their homes. 
The state sought to resume the provision of 
basic services, not only to win the ‘hearts and 
minds’ of the Daraa al-Balad inhabitants but also 
to convince the populations of other southern 
localities that the advantages of surrendering 
outweighed those of resisting. However, macro-
economic deterioration, limited resources and 
damage to infrastructure – estimated by local 
activists at more than 80 per cent in 2018 and 
compounded by the recent conflict – hinder 
notable large-scale improvements in service 
provision. Following three years of restrictions 
on access to equitable service delivery in Daraa 
al-Balad by the locals, the regime re-opened two 
bakeries, stationed four mobile clinics to provide 
health care, started simple repairs of power 
networks and improved the supply of drinking 
water. 
Rather than a deal limited to resolving a 
localised conflict, the regime capitalised on 
Russia’s support to replicate its approach and 
reproduce the Daraa al-Balad agreement so as 
to deconstruct active rebel networks in the main 
previously ‘reconciled’ hamlets. The unrestricted 
violence of the Syrian military forces in Daraa 
al-Balad and the promise to restore functioning 
systems of service delivery to the exhausted 
local population played pivotal roles in facilitating 
the conclusion of a series of new agreements 
in several localities, particularly ones with no 
reported overt resistance. Agreements between 
the MSCSS and Russian military officers, on 
the one hand, and representatives of local 
communities, be they members of the CNC or 
local notables, on the other, focused on and 
consecutively occurred in western Daraa. 
Map 1: Concluded ‘Reconciliation’ Deals,  
(as of 7 October 2021)
Source: The Author
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The process started in al-Yadudah, Mzeireb and 
Tafas (the major sources of lawlessness, unrest 
and violent mobilisation since 2018) and moved 
to include localities in al-Yarmouk Basin in the 
southwestern corner of the province and then 
to Nawa, Jasim, al-Sanamayn, and Inkhil in the 
north-west of the region (Map 1). In all these 
localities, Russian military police officers and 
Syrian military and security forces accepted the 
surrender of light and medium-sized weapons, 
conducted brief searches of neighbourhoods, 
established several checkpoints and opened 
‘reconciliation’ centres, where hundreds of 
applications from wanted individuals were 
submitted. 
Simultaneously, the Syrian army deployed 
contingents of its forces in locations near the 
border with Jordan. This occurred following a 
visit by the Syrian Defence Minister, General 
Ali Ayyoub, to Amman, where he discussed 
border security and future coordination with the 
Jordanian Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
Lieutenant General Youssef al-Huneiti.5 
2. The Reconfiguration of Local 
Orders in Southern Syria
The smooth unchallenged entry of the regime 
and the increasing ‘reconciliation’ turnout in 
a region renowned for being the epicentre of 
vital resistance is puzzling. According to many 
in Daraa, international consensus is what 
navigated the local dynamics and permitted the 
regime’s runaway victory. Questions about the 
performance and credibility of the CNC, both in 
Daraa al-Balad and western Daraa, are therefore 
crucial. “People in Daraa should investigate the 
role played by the [CNC] members during the 
negotiations. Were they complicit in facilitating 
a ‘soft surrender’ or just bad at negotiating?” 
asked a civilian in September. However, for 
others the recent ‘reconciliation’ agreements 
are not inclusive and do not reflect the reality 
on the ground but instead are a mere show that 
targets external states and aims to demonstrate 
the regime’s ability to pacify volatile areas. 
“Media outlets, including ones that claim to be 
5  Reuters, “Syrian Military Chief Makes Rare Visit to Jordan to Discuss Border Security,” 20 September 2021, https://reut.rs/3zBoG6A 
6 Abdullah Al-Jabassini, “From Rebel Rule to a Post-Capitulation Era in Daraa Southern Syria: The Impacts and Outcomes of Rebel Be-
haviour During Negotiations,” Working Paper (Florence: European University Institute, Middle East Directions, Wartime and Post-Con-
flict in Syria, January 2019), https://bit.ly/2CDpflK 
pro-revolution, are either complicit or have no 
idea about what is happening on the ground. 
Hundreds of wanted people have refused to 
‘reconcile’ their status. These deals are plays 
to show that the regime is now controlling the 
south,” explained a local residing in a town in 
which a ‘reconciliation’ agreement was recently 
concluded. Finally, some locals argue that the 
updated agreements are intended to divert the 
attention of external actors from the repositioning 
of contingents of Iranian and Iran-backed forces 
in the region, including ones that arrived there 
during the Daraa al-Balad offensive. One local 
activist residing in a locality near the Syrian-
Jordanian border argued in late September that 
“when you follow the news, you get the feeling 
that Iranian groups have vanished in southern 
Syria. It is a matter of time before they reappear 
in new places and under new covers.” 
Putting aside local perceptions, Daraa has 
reached a point of no return to the order that 
prevailed prior to June 2021. In so many ways, 
the Daraa al-Balad crisis and the ensuing 2021 
Russian-brokered agreements have implications 
for the established status quo in southern Syria. 
Remarkably, the new deal rescinds two essential 
core articles in the 2018 agreement, namely 
(1) the right of former rebels to keep their light 
firearms and (2) no presence of Syrian military 
and security forces inside the ‘reconciliation’ 
areas.6 Therefore, questions about how the new 
agreement impacts networks of resistance and 
redefines local orders need to be addressed
2.1 Daraa al-Balad: The End of Overt 
Resistance?
Since 2018, Daraa al-Balad, the old part of the 
provincial capital, had been characterised by 
tenuous regime control. The locals benefited
from semi-autonomy to manage local affairs and 
to continue to manifest opposition. On many 
occasions they took to the streets and under the 
auspices of the CNC demanded the release of 
detainees, an easing of security measures and 
an ousting of Iranian and Iran-backed groups 
from Daraa. The 2021 agreement, however, 
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allows the Syrian regime to disrupt the semi-
autonomous status and increase its degree of 
penetration in Daraa al-Balad. 
The outcome of the Daraa al-Balad conflict
has inevitable implications for the CNC. While 
the entity has been portrayed as an available 
yet ineffective intermediary actor,7 recent 
developments have revealed infiltration by the 
MSCSS, displaced active rebels and opposition 
figures, and a degree of internal fragmentation 
and rivalry amongst the CNC members. In 
addition, accusations by many locals and 
unreconciled rebels of ‘stark betrayal’ and 
‘complicity’ have serious consequences for the 
representation, legitimacy and functions of the 
entity. “We have suspicions that a few [CNC] 
members were cooperating with regime officials
to accelerate the surrender of Daraa al-Balad. To 
date, we do not know what the [CNC] members 
talked about during the negotiations,” a local 
from Daraa al-Balad explained in September.
Loosening the bonds among the few CNC 
members and between them and the local 
population serves the regime to widen its 
interventions in local affairs, monitor civilian 
conduct and punish defia ce. Given the limited 
number of checkpoints it can establish, the 
regime will continue to manoeuvre to bring Daraa 
al-Balad under firmer security control. The threat 
to inflict direct violence together with reliance 
on insiders in the Daraa al-Balad community 
solves the problem of identifying and deterring 
rebel agents and spoilers hiding among the 
local population. This, in turn, disrupts networks 
of mobilisation, impedes prospective violent 
and non-violent collective action and ensures a 
degree of regime control. To this end, the regime 
may capitalise on the fragmentation of the CNC 
to, first, exclude from local politics members who 
have high mobilisation capacity and are ready 
to exhibit defiance and, second, grant CNC 
members who signalled shifts in loyalty during 
the Daraa al-Balad negotiations the responsibility 
to maintain local security under the aegis of the 
regime’s military and security apparatuses. 
7 Abdullah Al-Jabassini, “Governance in Daraa, Southern Syria: The Roles of Military and Civilian Intermediaries,” Research Project 
Report (Florence: European University Institute, Middle East Directions, Wartime and Post-Conflict in Syria, November 2019), http://
bit.ly/38eCzKA 
8 This occurred after hundreds of integrated former rebels were discharged by Russia from the ranks of the Fifth Corps for refusing 
to fight alongside the Syrian army outside Daraa. See Abdullah Al-Jabassini, “From Rebel Rule to a Post-Capitulation Era in Daraa 
Southern Syria.”
2.2 Western Daraa: The Blackbox of 
Southern Syria
Tafas city and its surrounding areas are localities 
in western Daraa which were also included in the 
2018 Russian-led negotiations. Like Daraa al-
Balad, the area has been represented by a CNC 
composed of civilian members, ex-opposition 
figures and former rebel leaders. Remarkably, 
the latter have gained the upper hand over the 
civilian members, largely refrained from actively 
mobilising the masses and engaged in low-level 
but fuzzy and recurrent communications with 
the regime military and security officials. “We 
always hear that they [CNC members] have met 
with commanders from the Fourth Division and 
Military Security Branch, but they either deny it 
or avoid explaining what the meeting was about,” 
stated a local from Tafas in October. 
Since 2018, hundreds of former rebels have 
remained unreconciled or have signed contracts 
to join the ranks of the regime’s military and 
security forces as an ostensible tactic to 
guarantee security, continue possessing their 
light weapons and remain in their localities.8 In 
addition, the presence of Iranian forces and Iran-
backed proxies in the wider region of western 
Daraa and their active recruitment of former 
rebels have further complicated the security 
landscape and made a clear pattern of control 
hard to define. The state of lawlessness, the 
abundance of weapons and the presence of 
sheer numbers of unreconciled rebels and of 
Islamic State sleeper cells have made rampant 
violence a defining characteristic of western 
Daraa. 
The implementation of the new agreements in 
western Daraa has several crucial implications. 
First, the rapid and unchallenged surrender of 
the CNC during the negotiations is alleged to be 
with an eye to future rewards. The predominant 
military nature of its members and the close 
relationship they have with MSCSS officers are 
likely to grant them a new security role in western 
Daraa. Second, the surrender of weapons, 
the establishment of checkpoints in Tafas, 
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Mzeireb, al-Yadudah and al-Yarmouk Basin 
and the reconciliation of the status of hundreds 
of unreconciled rebels are measures that help 
the regime to reassert its presence, widen its 
interventions in local affairs, directly regulate 
activities and monitor the population. 
Third, in the past three years, the behaviour of 
reconciled rebels who joined the ranks of the 
Syrian military but remained closer to defiance
than loyalty constituted a substantial threat to 
the regime’s control in western Daraa.9 The 
new agreement reduces this threat by implicitly 
facilitating the deployment of reconciled rebels 
who joined the Fourth Division to active frontlines 
where the incentives to defect are too low and 
their ability to provoke unrest in recovered 
areas is minimal (e.g. to fight Islamic State in 
the Badia). In doing so, the regime weakens 
solidarity bonds and shrinks existing networks of 
rebellion in western Daraa. 
Finally, consistent with the recent agreement is 
the reported intention of the Fourth Division to 
withdraw outside Daraa. Such a development, if 
it happens, will temporarily delimit the presence 
and activities of Iranian and Iran-backed proxies 
in Daraa. However, if not already, Tehran will 
soon find new covers under which it can resume 
its planned expansion and recruitment of former 
rebels. Reaffirming its presence and relevance in 
the game in southern Syria is crucial for the long 
term, especially as Daraa will accommodate part 
of the Arab Gas Pipeline project.10 
2.3 Eastern Daraa: The Stronghold of the 
Eighth Brigade
In Eastern Daraa, the Eighth Brigade, a 
subdivision of the Russian-backed Fifth Corps, 
has emerged as the chief armed actor in the city 
of Busra al-Sham and its surrounding area.11 
Established in October 2018 and composed of 
nearly 1,600 former rebels, the Brigade has been 
in charge of handling local security affairs and 
has operated as an effective intermediary actor 
between regime officials and the local population 
9 For example, many reconciled rebels, mostly in the ranks of the Fourth Division, responded to solidarity-based appeals during the 
Daraa al-Balad conflict and turned their weapons on military checkpoints and captured security and military personnel
10 The Arab Gas Pipeline is a trans-regional gas export pipeline built to carry natural gas from Egypt to Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. See 
Reuters, “Lebanon to Get Egyptian Gas Via Syria in Plan to Ease Crisis,” 8 September 2021, https://reut.rs/3mE7vgD 
11 Abdullah Al-Jabassini, “From Insurgents to Soldiers: The Fifth Assault Corps in Daraa, Southern Syria,” Research Project Report, 
(Florence: European University Institute, Middle East Directions, Wartime and Post-Conflict in Syria, 14 May 2020), http://bit.ly/2oT-
zoXG 
to release arrested individuals at regime 
checkpoints and to convey civilian demands to 
improve service delivery. As a consequence, the 
Brigade has been able to maintain a degree of 
order and establish a relatively secure climate. 
Beyond its areas of control, the Brigade has 
also intervened to defuse tensions and broker 
agreements across Daraa governorate. So far, 
the Brigade has been able to capitalise on the 
volatility and chaos in southern Syria and it has 
become an armed actor with an indispensable 
military, security and intermediary role.
The implementation of new agreements has 
largely been concentrated in western Daraa, 
leaving the eastern region so far untouched. 
In fact, the Syrian regime and Russia consider 
eastern Daraa to be more orderly than any other 
part of the region. This is because a clear pattern 
of control has been easily defined. Moreover, the 
Eighth Brigade lacks official recognition by the 
Syrian Ministry of Defence but enjoys genuine 
Russian patronage and has active channels to 
the Syrian regime, through which cooperation 
or non-cooperation can be discussed and 
negotiated. This, however, does not mean that 
its fighters in the eastern region are immune to 
renewed deals in the foreseeable future. 
While Eighth Brigade fighters that operate 
outside eastern Daraa have just embarked on a 
‘reconciliation’ process, for example in the town 
of Inkhil in October, there are signs that the new 
agreements are likely to be implemented in a 
few localities characterised by vital networks of 
resistance with a history of attacks on the military 
and security forces, a presence of Islamic State 
sleeper cells and localised tribal conflicts in 
eastern Daraa (Map. 2). These include, for 
instance, Nahta, Busr al-Harir, al-Hrak and al-
Jizeh. If new deals are to be implemented in 
eastern Daraa, then the Eighth Brigade is likely 
to demonstrate an atrophied intermediary role. 
This is not only because of limitations imposed by 
Russia but also because of the Eighth Brigade’s 
preference to not get involved in agreements that 
may backfire and embroil its fighters in spirals 
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of tribal violence. The same factors explain 
the insignificant intermediary role it played in 
the Daraa al-Balad conflict and account for 
its large absence from the negotiations and 
implementations of the local deals in western 
Daraa.
Map 2: Anticipated ‘Reconciliation’ Deals in 
Eastern Daraa
Source: The Author
Lastly, in Busra al-Sham, the headquarters of the 
Eighth Brigade, pressure to strip the Brigade of 
its semi-autonomous character and put an end 
to its loose and nominal affiliation with the Syrian 
military institution is likely to be renewed. In 
return for rations, salaries and official recognition 
by the central authorities, Russia may negotiate 
with the commander of the Eighth Brigade, 
Ahmad al-Oda, to renounce the exclusionary 
structure of the Brigade and accept it being set 
in the official structure of the Syrian military.12 
An exclusionary structure may be tolerable for 
the time being if a redeployment of the Eighth 
Brigade staff from the military institution to a 
security apparatus in southern Syria occurs. 
Such a scenario may be imminent and the 
possibility cannot be dismissed. 
12  Al-Oda has agreed to integrate former rebels, draft dodgers and military deserters and defectors who hail from Daraa, but he has so 
far refused to admit soldiers and military officers who come from elsewhere in Syria. See Abdullah Al-Jabassini, “The Eighth Brigade: 
Striving for Supremacy in Southern Syria,” Syria Transition Challenges Project, Geneva Centre for Security Policy and European Uni-
versity Institute Middle East Directions Programme, Research Project Report, 1 December 2020, October 2020, https://bit.ly/3n2uDEr 
Conclusion
The Daraa al-Balad conflict and its wider 
regional implications have opened a new 
chapter in the history of southern Syria. Whether 
they are genuine settlements or not, such easily 
implemented localised deals are consistent with 
regional understandings and therefore may 
spill into the neighbouring volatile provinces 
of Quneitra and Sweida. Locally, the rapidly 
accepted agreements across Daraa increase the 
regime’s presence, support its officials  claims of 
absolute control and convey its ability to stabilise 
the border region. Particular figures within the 
CNC such as Daraa al-Balad and Tafas are 
likely to be rewarded for facilitating expanding 
regime security control with batches of released 
detainees and a shared responsibility to manage 
local security affairs. Against the backdrop of 
decreasing mobilisation capacity and problems 
of representation and legitimacy, this could help 
the CNCs to regain a degree of trust and promote 
their role in the eyes of many locals. 
The sharp decline in the number of violent events 
in Daraa governorate in September 2021 does 
not necessarily denote stability. Private conflicts,
personal gain, vendettas and the settling of old 
scores will continue to trigger cycles of violence, 
albeit at a lower pace. Finally, giving the regime 
an upper hand and allowing expanding security 
control were clearly points of convergence 
for Russia and Iran. This refutes insights that 
portray Russia and Iran as permanent rivals 
in southern Syria. Nevertheless, Russia will 
continue to monitor the presence of Iranian and 
Iran-backed groups in Syria’s south and to use 
this as a bargaining chip vis-à-vis external actors 
to advance its regional interests and reaffirm the 
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